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Joshua P. Hochschild: 
 
Cajetan on Scotus on Univocity 
 
What role does Scotus‘s understanding of univocity play in Cajetan‘s development of a 
theory of analogy? In this paper I examine three relevant texts from Cajetan – question 
3 of his commentary on Aquinas‘s De Ente et Essentia, his treatise De Nominum 
Analogia, and his commentary on question 13, article 5 of Aquinas‘s Summa 
Theologiae – in which Cajetan articulates his understanding of analogy at least in part 
through dialectical engagement with Scotus‘s arguments about univocity. It is not my 
intention to evaluate the fairness of Cajetan‘s interpretation or deployment of Scotus‘s 
position, or to say whether the arguments Cajetan considers are in fact representative of 
Scotus‘s views – that I will leave to more competent scholars of Scotus.1 Rather, I want 
to illuminate the function that, in Cajetan‘s mind, certain theses and arguments 
associated with Scotus play in formulating problems that Cajetan‘s theory of analogy 
proposes to solve. 
Some influence of Scotus (and Scotists) in the development of Cajetan‘s analogy theory 
is widely acknowledged. Also well known is the influence of Cajetan on the subsequent 
history of Thomistic reflection on analogy. In recent generations of scholarship – thanks 
in part to arguments from influential Thomistic philosophers (like Étienne Gilson) and 
thanks also to discussions among theologians about the significance of the analogia 
entis – Cajetan is often criticized for a position that was so preoccupied with Scotus‘s 
approach as to be (inadvertently) coopted by it. According to a common version of this 
criticism, Scotus‘s arguments provoked Cajetan to become preoocupied with analyzing 
the analogical ―concept,‖ while a more authentically Thomistic approach would have 
treated analogy instead as a matter of ―judgment.‖2 
This trend of criticizing Cajetan for a ―conceptualist‖ or even ―univocalist‖ account of 
analogy provides the background for my reflections on Cajetan‘s use of arguments from 
Scotus about univocity. One of the lessons of my analysis is that this common criticism 
of Cajetan is misplaced. Cajetan is indeed concerned to answer particular problems 
                                                 
1 On the side of philosophical theology, one might start with Alexander W. Hall, Thomas Aquinas and 
John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages (Continuum, 2007), esp. chs. 4-7. On the 
side of logic and semantics, see Giorgi Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of 
Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 
2 For references and discussion, see Joshua P. Hochschild, ―Analogy, Semantics, and Hermeneutics: The 
‗Concept vs. Judgment‘ Critique of Cajetan‘s De Nominum Analogia,‖ Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology 11 (2003): 241-260. 
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raised by Scotus, but in doing so he refuses to adopt, and pointedly criticizes, key 
semantic assumptions behind Scotus‘s position. Furthermore, Cajetan‘s response to 
Scotus confirms that while he intended to answer semantic or ―conceptualist‖ objections 
with his own alternative semantic analysis of analogy, Cajetan saw that the Thomistic 
disagreement with Scotus could not be addressed only at the semantic level but 
depended ultimately on distinctions at the level of metaphysics. 
 
The Commentary on De Ente et Essentia (1495) 
Proceeding in chronological order, I will discuss first Cajetan‘s commentary on 
Aquinas‘s treatise De Ente et Essentia. Composed in 1495, this is a fairly youthful work 
– Cajetan was 26 years old. Recently appointed to the Chair of Thomistic Metaphysics 
at the University of Padua, Cajetan‘s expected duties would have included criticism of 
Scotistic views. Indeed, while Cajetan comments line by line, his commentary is 
interspersed with extended questions which often address particular issues where 
Thomists differed from Scotists (e.g. on the first object of intellection, on individuation, 
etc.). Cajetan engages Scotus on univocity in question 3: Whether being is predicated 
univocally of substance and accident, or primarily of substance (sect. 17 – 21). 
In elaborating on the question (sect. 18) Cajetan makes clear that what is at stake is not 
primarily a metaphysical issue, but a semantic or epistemological one. As Cajetan puts 
it, analogy can be considered according to the being of the predicates (secundum esse 
illius praedicati), when a predicate has being in different things with an order of 
priority; this occurs even for a genus term when its species have an order of priority, 
such as higher or lower orders of animals. (Cajetan cites Aristotle‘s Metaphysics, Book 
XII, and in De Nominum Analogia he will call this ―analogy of inequality.‖) Analogy in 
the sense that Cajetan wants to consider it is not according to this order in reality, but 
according to an order in intelligible content: it is when a word is predicated ―per prius et 
posterius secundum rationem propriam.‖ This occurs when a word, predicated of two 
(or more) things, has a primary ratio when predicated of one, and a ratio somehow 
related to that primary ratio when predicated of the other (or others). The classic 
example, which Cajetan here uses, is ―healthy‖: it‘s primary meaning pertains to the 
health of the animal; its secondary meanings pertain to what is related to this primary 
meaning, as ―healthy‖ predicated of urine, diet, and medicine signify respectively 
relations of sign, preservative, and cause of animal health. 
Does the word ―being‖ exhibit the same order of rationes when predicated of substance 
and accident? This is the central point of contention that Cajetan sees between himself 
and Scotus (―in hoc pendet tota quaestio inter nos et Scotum‖). We might say that it is 
not about the analogy of being but the analogy of “being”. At stake in this question of 
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analogy is the concept or ratio of being – which is to say, as Cajetan clarifies earlier in 
his commentary, the signification of the word ―being.‖3 
Cajetan recapitulates at some length arguments from Scotus for the position that 
―being‖ is univocal (section 19). He gives five distinct arguments (from Scotus‘s 
Oxford commentary on the Sentences, Book I, dist. III, qq. 1 & 3; dist. 8, q. 3
4
), 
presumably ones that would be familiar to Scotists and to critics of Scotus. To 
summarize them briefly: 
(S1) We can be certain that something is a being while doubting whether it is God or 
a creature, finite or infinite, substance or accident; so the concept of being must 
be other than these, but included in these.
5
 
(S2) We can learn about God from creatures, but whatever concepts we have that 
apply to God were acquired from objects illuminated in the phantasms acquired 
from creatures, and any such objects must be essentially or virtually contained in 
the phantasms.
6
 
(S3) Again regarding theological discovery: reflection about God depends on 
attending to the ratio of something, stripping away the imperfections, and 
attributing to it the highest perfections; but we must start with the same formal 
ratio (or concept), which is therefore univocal to both perfect and imperfect 
beings.
7
 
(S4) We have quidditative knowledge of substance, but we only know substance via 
accidents, not directly
8
; so the concept of substance must be abstracted from the 
accident.
9
 
                                                 
3 ―It is the same to speak of the concept of being as to speak of the signification of „being‟‖ (idem est 
loqui de conceptu entis et de significatione ejus), §14. Alternatively, ―It is the same to speak of ‗being‘s 
concept as to speak of its signification.‖ 
4 The Laurent edition of Cajetan refers to Scotus‘s q. 2 of d. 8, but the relevant text is clearly q. 3, and 
Cajetan gets the reference correct in his commentary on ST 13.5. 
5 Cf. Duns Scotus, Commentaria Oxoniensia, I, d. 3, qq. 1&2, a. 4 (ed. Garcia, Florence, 1912), arg. #1, 
p. 309-310; cf. d. 8, q. 3, a. 1 [#624, pp. 593-594]. 
6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Comm. Ox., d. 3, q. 1-2, a. 4, arg. #2, p. 311; also d. 8, q. 3, a. 1 (#623. p 591). 
7 Cf. Duns Scotus, Comm. Ox., d. 3, q. 1-2, a. 4, arg. #3, pp. 311-312; cf. d. 8, q. 3, a. 1 (#625, pp. 595-
596). 
8 As Scotus argues and Cajetan repeats: otherwise, for instance, we would be able to know by natural 
reason that the substance of bread is not present in the consecrated host! 
9 Duns Scotus, Comm. Ox. d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, pp. 338-339: ―quod Deus non est a nobis cognoscibilis 
naturaliter nisi ens sit univocum creato et Increato, ita potest argui de substantia et accidente; cum enim 
substantia non immutet immediate intellectum nostrum ad aliquam intellectionem sui, sed tantum 
accidens sensibile, sequitur quod nullum conceptum quidditativum habere poteribus de ea, nisi sit aliquis 
talis qui posit abstrahi a conceptu accidentis: sed nullus talis quidditativus abstrahibilis est a conceptu 
accidentis, nisi conceptus entis; ergo etc.‖ P. 339 discusses the bread and the host on the altar – if we 
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(S5) Lastly, Cajetan points out that Scotus appeals to several textual authorities, of 
which Cajetan names Aristotle, Avicenna, and Algazali. Cajetan‘s longest 
discussion here is of a passage from Aristotle‘s Metaphysics (Book II), when 
Aristotle says (on Scotus‘s interpretation) that comparison of degree implies a 
univocal predication. (Met. II.1, 993b23-25) (Cajetan ends his summary by 
saying that the other authorities cited by Scotus, which he will not summarize, 
only prove the otherness (alietas) of being, not the univocation of being – i.e., 
that they show that there is a distinct concept of being, but not that the concept is 
univocal.) 
In these arguments, the attention to concept acquisition, judgments of comparison, 
certainty and doubt, and inference all reinforce that the essential issue for Cajetan, as 
well as for Scotus, is not metaphysical but epistemological or semantic. 
After stating these five arguments, Cajetan gives three reductio arguments against 
Scotus‘s conclusion that being is univocal (sect. 20). These do not resolve the issue and 
do not give Cajetan‘s full position, but they offer reasons to reject Scotus‘s conclusion. 
Effectively, they constitute an extended sed contra in the overall dialectical structure of 
the question. Briefly summarized, Cajetan‘s arguments are as follows: 
(C1) Accident defined insofar as it is being includes substance in its ratio, but 
substance as being does not include accident in its ratio – therefore being does 
not have the same ratio as predicated of substance and accident. 
(C2) If ―being‖ is univocal, it is a genus; but this leads to difficulties – such as that it 
would be included in both the definition of the genus and the definition of the 
difference (insofar as both are beings), but then a full definition of a species 
(including both genus and difference) would be nugatory. 
(C3) If being is a genus term, then it falls within the definition of substance, and so of 
man, which is contrary to Aristotle‘s teaching. 
Following these arguments, Cajetan gives (what he claims is) the teaching of Saint 
Thomas (sect. 21); one might think of this as the corpus or main reply to the question. I 
will outline that position here, keeping in mind that my object is not to articulate fully 
Cajetan‘s teaching on analogy, but only to highlight those features pertinent to 
Cajetan‘s dialectical deployment of Scotus. 
Cajetan describes analogy as a mean between univocation and equivocation. Following 
the structure of Aristotle‘s definitions from the beginning of the Categories, he gives 
definitions of the univocal, then of the equivocal, describing them as having a common 
name which refers to different things by means of concepts (rationes) either wholly the 
same or wholly different. In the mean of analogy, there is a common name ―and the 
                                                                                                                                               
could know substance immediately, ―sequeretur quod quando susbtantia non esset praesens posset 
naturaliter cognosci non esse praesens; et ita naturaliter posset cognosci in hostia Altaris consecrate non 
esse substantiam panis: quod est manifese falsum.‖ 
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ratio corresponding to that name is in one sense the same and in one sense different, or 
is the same in a qualified sense, and different in a qualified sense.‖ 
Cajetan then proceeds to distinguish two ways that the ratio can be somehow the same 
and somehow different: either (1) because there are two rationes with a determinate 
relation to each other, or (2) because there are two rationes which are proportionally 
similar. In other words, the secundum quid similarity between two concepts in one case 
is that one concept has a determinate relation to another, while the secundum quid 
similarity in the other case is ―not that the analogue is predicated simply of the primary 
analogate and of others relative to the primary, but because they have a concept or ratio 
which is the same in a qualified sense, owing to the sameness of proportion which is 
found in them, and different in a qualified sense, owing to the diversity of the given 
natures with these proportions‖ (emphasis added). 
These are the two modes of analogy Cajetan will later (in De Nominum Analogia) call 
analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality. Although he doesn‘t use 
those terms here (and he here doesn‘t make the further claim of De Nominum Analogia 
that one is a more genuine or proper mode of analogy), we can see that analogy of 
proper proportionality is a more genuine or proper mean between univocation and 
equivocation. This becomes clear when Cajetan offers two corollaries or conclusions of 
his analysis: (1) being is analogous in both modes when predicated of substance and 
accident; and (2) being is analogous only in the latter mode when predicated of God and 
creatures. 
For the second conclusion, Cajetan cites the authority of Aquinas‘s De Veritate 2.11, 
but textual support seems secondary; Cajetan‘s semantic rationale is clear: analogy of 
proportionality is not a form of univocation (because there is a proportional 
relationship, not specific or generic identity or some other determinate relationship, 
between creatures and God), but is sufficiently unified – proportionally unified – to 
warrant inferences from creatures to God. Cajetan even cites the authority of Aristotle 
for his conviction that proportional unity is sufficient for scientific inference. 
The significance of this as a response to the arguments from Scotus is clear. Scotus 
argued for univocity in order to preserve the possibility of knowledge (as judgment or 
assent, and as discursive inference) that would be threatened by error or fallacy if the 
relevant key term ―being‖ were equivocal. Cajetan‘s response is that ―it is not necessary 
to say that ―being‖ is univocal in order for it to have attributes that ground a 
contradiction (i.e. when affirmed and denied of the same thing) [ens non oprtet poni 
univocum ad hoc quod passiones habeat et contradictionem fundet…].‖ Instead, unity 
of proportion suffices. 
Cajetan finishes the question by making this implicit response to Scotus explicit, giving 
careful replies to the objections, that is, responding to each of Scotus‘s five arguments 
for the univocity of being (section 21a): 
Ad (S1) To the argument about the possibility of having certainty with respect to one 
concept while doubting others, Cajetan replies that being is a concept distinct 
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from or other than the concept of substance and accident, but it is not univocal 
to them. 
Ad (S2) To the argument about the content of an abstracted concept being already 
contained in the phantasm, Cajetan replies that we can gain a concept that is 
not itself already in the phantasm, because the phantasm does not have to 
contain the cause virtually or essentially; the phantasm of an effect can contain 
the concept of the cause participatively – i.e. insofar as the cause is 
proportionally similar to the effect (cf. Cajetan‘s commentary on ST I, 13.5, 
section X). 
Ad (S3) To the argument about purifying a ratio of its imperfections, Cajetan says that 
the process can involve an analogous or only proportionally unified formal 
ratio. In other words, the result of the ―purification‖ process is not the 
identical concept purified, but a new concept proportionally similar to the 
original concept. 
Ad (S4) To the argument about only accidents modifying the intellect, Cajetan 
responds that substance does modify the intellect by its proper species, and not 
only by the species of accidents.
10
 
Ad (S5) Lastly, regarding Scotus‘s appeal to textual authority, Cajetan offers 
reinterpretations of the relevant texts; in particular, concerning Aristotle, 
Cajetan invokes a principle that a medium compared to an extreme takes on 
the characteristics of the opposite extreme
11
; so in contrasting an analogical 
term to an equivocal term, Aristotle emphasized unity, and indeed comparison 
(e.g. of greater or lesser) does imply a unity in the standard of comparison, but 
not univocation. Again, proportional unity suffices. 
At this point let me highlight some general points about Cajetan‘s use of Scotus in q. 3 
of the De Ente et Essentia commentary. First, Scotus figures quite prominently to frame 
the objections, setting up a set of problems that Cajetan thinks a Thomistic account of 
analogy must solve. (It seems that is not especially relevant that Scotus developed his 
position against Henry of Ghent, since Scotus‘s arguments serve equally well as 
objections to Aquinas‘s position.) Second, while it is the univocity of being that is at 
stake, in Scotus‘s arguments and Cajetan‘s response the issue is logical, not 
metaphysical or theological. When Cajetan does treat the metaphysical and theological 
questions, it is as different applications of logical distinctions. Third, the semantic 
concerns intensified by Scotus all pertain to how an analogical concept could have 
sufficient unity to ground knowledge without being univocal. A non-univocal concept, 
for Scotus, called into question the intelligibility of individual concepts, the sense of 
                                                 
10 But it does so through accidents, which is why the accidents of bread can still give the impression of 
the substance of bread, much as they nourish us! 
11 Cajetan invoked the same principle earlier in sect. 21. 
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particular judgments, and the validity of inferences in discursive reasoning. Cajetan‘s 
response boils down to the position that proportional unity is sufficient to do the work 
that Scotus had assigned only to univocity. There is not one analogical concept, but two 
concepts whose proportional similarity allows them to function as if they are one. (And 
Cajetan‘s twice-invoked warning about the mean looking like an extreme acknowledges 
that the analogue may seem univocal, but only because it has sufficient unity to be 
differentiated from what is equivocal.) 
De Nominum Analogia (1498) 
Cajetan‘s separate, dedicated treatise on analogy was written three years after his 
commentary on De Ente et Essentia. A distinction between modes of analogy, and a 
preference for analogy of proportionality – these are the main teachings for which his 
treatise ―on the analogy of names‖ is remembered, but as we have seen these were 
already present in outline in the De Ente commentary‘s question on univocation. In the 
treatise, these teachings are more systematically worked out, and the context is even 
more explicitly a logical or semantic project. Indeed, the treatise on analogy could 
almost be read as an extended appendix to Cajetan‘s Categories commentary (written 
earlier the same year), where he mentioned analogy briefly in the traditional context of 
the definition of equivocation, and promised to treat further questions about analogy in 
a separate work.
12
 
De Nominum Analogia is structured to offer a treatment of analogy through the three 
parts of logic.
13
 Here explicit attention to Scotus is much more muted. Scotus is not 
named early on, although presumably some of his arguments are in the background. The 
general question that motivates the treatise – to describe the unity of the analogical 
concept – shows attention to Scotus‘s concerns. And certainly some chapters start by 
posing problems that could be traced to Scotistic objections. Chapter 5 begins by posing 
a question about how abstraction works for analogy. Chapter 6 begins with a question 
about how an analogical predicate can be superior – that is, universal without being 
generic and so univocal.
14
 In the discussion of comparison in Chapter 8, Cajetan says – 
in what surely sounds like a reference to Scotists – that ―it is believed by many‖ that 
there can‘t be comparison of greater or lesser without something [univocally] common. 
But Scotus is not mentioned by name in De Nominum Analogia until the penultimate 
chapter, when the semantics of analogy is applied to discursive reasoning in order to 
                                                 
12 Cajetan, Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis, ed. M.H.Laurent (Rome, 1939), p. 11: ―Quot 
autem modis contingat variari analogiam et quomodo, nunc quum summarie loquimur, silentio 
pertransibimus, specialem de hoc tractatum, si Deo placuerit, cito confecturi.‖ 
13 Cf. Joshua P. Hochschild, ―The Rest of Cajetan‘s Analogy Theory: De Nominum Analogia chapters 4-
11,‖ International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2005): 341-356. 
14 Also in ch. 6, in sect. 69, Cajetan discusses an objection which he says commits the fallacy of the 
consequent; in his commentary on ST 13.5 Cajetan attributes this same objection to Scotus. 
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address ―how there is scientific knowledge [scientia] of the analogue‖ (ch. 10). Scotus 
and his followers are referred to obliquely in sect. 104 (―it appears to some that there 
cannot be science of the analogue…‖) and Scotus is finally named in sect. 106 as 
defending this position. 
Cajetan also presents Scotus‘s definition of a univocal concept in sect. 113: ―I call a 
univocal concept what is one in such a way that its unity suffices for contradiction when 
it is affirmed and denied of the same thing.‖ 15 Cajetan finds this definition of univocity 
inadequate. Scotus ―either poorly explained the univocal concept, or contradicted 
himself‖ – i.e. since proportional unity is sufficient to preserve the reasoning, either this 
is a bad definition of univocity, or as a definition of ―univocity‖ it can‘t be used to say 
that analogical terms can‘t be used in scientific reasoning.16 Cajetan‘s response to these 
issues, then, rests on an appeal to proportional unity. Such unity is sufficient for valid 
reasoning (again, as in the De Ente et Essentia commentary, citing Aristotle‘s Posterior 
Analytics, Bk. II). 
Here I offer an intermediate summary. In comparison with the extensive dialectical use 
of Scotus to frame the issue in the De Ente commentary, Cajetan‘s use of Scotus in the 
De Nominum Analogia is muted. This might seem coy, but it is reasonable, given that 
the goal here is to produce a treatise (not a polemic) expounding a theory (not just an 
interpretation of Aquinas or a reply to his critics).
17
 It is quite clear that the work is 
motivated not just by the Scotistic objection to analogy but by the failure of other 
Thomists to adequately respond to it. (In the very first paragraph, Cajetan mentions 
three alternative inadequate accounts of the unity of the analogical concept.) It is also 
                                                 
15 Duns Scotus, Comm. Ox., I, d. 3, qq. 1&2, a. 4, ¶346 (309): ―...conceptum univocum dico qui ita est 
unus, quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem: sufficit etiam 
pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter 
se uniri.‖ Cf. Duns Scotus, In Librum Praedicamentorum Quaestiones, q. 1: ―ubi est idem conceptus, ibi 
est univocatio.‖ Cf. Duns Scotus, In Libros Elenchorum Quaestiones, 2 (Vives 1891, 20a-25a). 
Presumably this identification of univocity with the power to mediate valid inference became typical of 
the Scotistic position; although I have conducted no systematic survey, the first Scotist Categories 
commentary I pulled off the shelf seems perfectly in line here: it treats analogy as ―equivocatio a 
consilio‖ where there are diverse significations, ―quorum unum dicit similitudinem vel proportionem ad 
aliud, nequaquam tamen convenientia in ratione formali una,‖ from which it is concluded that ―de 
aequivocis non est scientia quia deficient ab unitate.‖ Augustinus de Ferraria, Queastiones Super Librum 
Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, ed. Robert Andrews, Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis (Studia Latina 
Stockholmiensia) XLV, 2000, pp. 23-24 (emphasis added). 
16 I am unaware of philosophers before Scotus who explicitly defined univocity in terms of the ability to 
found a contradiction. More typical in the Aristotelian commentary tradition is the mention of the ability 
to found a contradiction as a feature of univocal terms, e.g. Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle‟s 
Categories, 34. 7-11 (On Aristotle‟s ―Categories 1-4,‖ trans. Michael Chase, Cornell University Press, 
2003, p. 48). But this is still compatible with treating analogous terms as a mean between univocation and 
equivocation, exhibiting some features of both. 
17 It is worth noting also that Scotus is not mentioned in Cajetan‘s letter De Conceptu Entis (1509) which 
offers clarifications of, and is traditionally printed with, the treatise on analogy. 
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true that it would be difficult to find in Aquinas a direct answer to Scotus‘s concern. 
Although Aquinas clearly saw that analogy required semantic attention, his own 
discussions of the semantic functions of analogical terms remain unsystematic and 
incomplete.
18
 Hence Cajetan sensed the need for an independent treatise, rather than a 
simple commentary or compilation of texts. 
But although Scotus is named only at the end, the influence of Scotus through the whole 
spectrum of logical or semantic concerns – from the semantics of terms to the structure 
of discursive reasoning – is clear. And while Cajetan‘s ultimate goal, like Scotus, is to 
explain the possibility of scientific reasoning, Scotus‘s error is traced to an inadequate 
definition of univocation and a failure to recognize proportional unity as a legitimate 
and relevant kind of unity. 
Commentary on the Summa Theologiae (1507?) 
Our last text to consider is Cajetan‘s commentary on article 5 of question 13 of 
Aquinas‘s Summa Theologiae, on whether names are applied to God and creatures 
univocally. Cajetan defends at length the structure of Aquinas‘s argument for the 
negative. Scotus is named in sect. IX, for his ―many arguments‖ from I Sent., d. 3, q. 1 
and 3, and d. 8, q. 3 – the same passages as discussed at length in the De Ente 
commentary. 
Cajetan refers his readers to that commentary, and here only briefly describes four of 
Scotus‘s arguments: 
(T1) We can have certainty of one concept while doubting another concept [=(S1) 
above] 
(T2) In gaining knowledge of God, one formal ratio is stripped of imperfections [una 
ratione formali] [=(S3) above] 
(T3) God is known by a simple concept [naturaliter cognoscibilis aliqu simplici 
conceptu] contained either essentially or virtually in what is in the phantasm 
[=(S2) above] 
(T4) Comparison implies univocation [=(S5) above; Cf. DNA ch. 8] 
Cajetan offers responses to each of these arguments (section X): 
Ad (T1) It is a sophisma consequentis to say that the community of the concept 
implies univocation. Univocation implies community, but community does 
not imply univocation. Both univocals and analogues are superior to 
inferiors, but univocals are superior as prescinding from inferiors, while 
                                                 
18 See Joshua P. Hochschild, ―Did Aquinas Answer Cajetan‘s Question? Aquinas‘s Semantic Rules for 
Analogy and the Interpretation of De Nominum Analogia,‖ Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 77 (2003): 273-288. 
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analogues are superior as containing them both. (Cajetan refers to De 
Nominum Analogia, where he makes these arguments in ch. 4.) 
Ad (T2) The ratio is one not simply, but by analogy (ratione una non simpliciter, sed 
secundum analogiam); some concepts can be ―polished‖ to apply to God 
(analogically), other concepts (like stone) cannot be so polished since they 
always contain imperfection. (For Scotus on sapiens vs. lapis, cf. d. 8, q. 3, 
a. 1, #626, p. 596.) 
Ad (T3) In addition to essential or virtual inclusion in the phantasm, there is a third 
mode of inclusion, by participation or imitation (participative vel imitative) 
[cf. De Nominum Analogia 90, 92, which mentions participation while 
discussing comparison] 
Ad (T4) There is comparison of the analogue, which is not an equivocal but a mean 
between the equivocal and the univocal, thanks to a unity that is 
proportional, not simple. (This is a topic in Ch. 8 of De Nominum Analogia, 
to which Cajetan refers.) 
So here in the Summa commentary, the extended, explicit dialectical engagement with 
Scotus is restored after being dropped in the treatise; but Cajetan‘s general theoretical 
position is the same.
19
 The arguments are indeed pared down, with reference made both 
to the treatise on analogy and commentary on De Ente et Essentia for further 
elaboration. And here, even before mentioning Scotus, Cajetan spends more time 
describing the proportional relationship between concepts, how such concepts are 
acquired, and how they function in theological reasoning. 
Conclusion 
In Cajetan‘s treatment of analogy, Scotus‘s position presented a semantic problem, 
calling into question the very possibility of analogy as a mean between univocation and 
equivocation. As Scotus would have it, a concept is per se univocal. Univocation thus 
involves one concept, equivocation involves two, but there is no room for analogy as a 
mean between these two alternatives. 
In responding to this challenge, Cajetan in a sense concedes that a concept is strictly 
speaking univocal, but he insists that two concepts that are different can be 
proportionally one. In this case, one can speak of ―a‖ concept which is an analogical 
concept, just to the extent that the unity of this ―one‖ concept is only proportional unity. 
Cajetan‘s response, then, depends on a metaphysical distinction between kinds of unity. 
The success of Cajetan‘s response rests entirely on the success of his appeal to the 
reality of proportionally unified concepts. 
                                                 
19 Cajetan does provide an alternative way of describing the relationship of participation, i.e. as 
―imitation.‖ 
42 
As a solution to Scotus‘ semantic challenge, Cajetan‘s teaching on proportional unity is 
fully present in the earliest relevant text, in the commentary on De Ente et Essentia. 
What he says in later writings does not modify or substantially add to what is found 
there. The De Nominum Analogia provides more systematic attention to the relevant 
semantics and epistemology, especially with its discussion of concept acquisition, 
judgment, and discursive reasoning. The discussion in the Summa Theologiae 
commentary adds further considerations about the acquisition of theological concepts. 
One might say that this attention to concept acquisition and reasoning extends, rather 
than replaces, Aquinas‘s attention to the role of judgment in analogy. Scotus‘s views on 
univocity highlighted the semantic pecularity of analogy, and Cajetan saw this as a 
dialectically useful opportunity to defend a Thomistic understanding of thought and 
signification, appealing to a metaphysical distinction – between pure and proportional 
unity – in order to elaborate the semantics of analogy further than Aquinas ever did. 
 
 
